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The purpose of this paper is to investigate how trust and cultural devices a#ect the
outcomes of ultimatum, dictator, and trust games. Of our particular concern is how such
devices increase e$ciency. In order to pursue this purpose, I performed experiments involving
the above three standard games and their variants. In the variant games the subjects were
either allowed to punish their opponents without bearing their own costs or forced to play the
games in the presence of several other subjects (third parties). The experimental results
demonstrate that such cultural devices of punishment and monitoring increase e$ciency.
I. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how trust and cultural devices a#ect the
outcomes of ultimatum, dictator, and trust games. Of our particular concern is how such
devices increase e$ciency. In order to pursue this purpose, I performed experiments involving
the above three standard games and their variants. This paper reports the results of those
experiments and considers their implications.
In the standard trust game, the experimenter forms pairs of subjects and nominates one
member of each pair to be the proposer and the other the responder. The experimenter gives,
say, 1,000 yen to the former, who then divides it into two parts, one for himself and the other
for the latter (the divided amount may be zero). The experimenter triples the amount the
former divided for the latter and gives the tripled amount to the latter, who is then allowed to
return some portion of this given amount to the former as an expression of thanks.
The proposer’s payo# in this game is the sum of the amount he divides for himself and the
amount his responder returns. On the other hand, the responder’s payo# is the amount he
receives from the experimenter net of the amount he returns to his proposer.
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this trust game is the state in which the
proposer takes all 1,000 yen and gives nothing to his responder, if played by those who believe
that all human beings are egoistic or individually rational. An egoistic responder will not
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Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 47 (2006), pp.249-264.  Hitotsubashi Universityreturn any amount in response to his proposer’s positive o#er. Thus, if the proposer gives a
positive amount to his responder in an experiment, the former can be considered as thinking
that human beings are not necessarily pure egoists.
In the standard ultimatum game, the experimenter forms pairs of subjects as above and
gives 1,000 yen to the proposer, who then proposes how to divide the amount between him and
his responder. If the latter accepts the proposal, the initially proposed amount for each will be
each player’s payo#. If he rejects it, the payo# for each will be zero.
If the above division of money is made only in integers, the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium is the state in which the proposer gives one yen to his responder and keeps the rest
for himself. An individually rational responder will not reject that o#er; otherwise his payo#
would be zero. On the other hand, the proposer can maximize his payo# by giving only one yen
to his responder. In contrast, if the proposer gives more than one yen in an experiment, he
must believe that his responder is other than an individually rational person.
In the dictator game, after forming pairs as above, the experimenter gives 1,000 yen to one
member of each pair (the dictator), and tells him to divide it into an amount for himself and
that for the other member (again the divided amount may be zero). The game ends when the
dictator has determined the division and it has been carried out. The payo#s are exactly as
divided by the dictator. This play is called the dictator ‘game’, even though it is not actually
a game, since the opponent of the dictator is not allowed to choose a strategy. It is obvious that
an egoistic dictator will keep all 1,000 yen for himself.
What is striking about these three types of games is that experimental outcomes tend to
di#er markedly from theoretical predictions. In many experiments involving the ultimatum
game, those responders who were o#ered small amounts tended to reject them. This means that
they punished those proposers who had done them an injustice, although they knew that
rejection would mean them incurring a loss or a cost. Thaler (1988) and Guth and Tietz
(1990) include surveys of ultimatum game experiments. The former emphasizes that the
proposers in these experimental games tend to give their responders an amount between 30%
and 40% of that given by the experimenter. See also Fehr and Gachter (2000a, 2000b) for
related arguments.
Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) conducted a trust game experiment involving
mutually anonymous opponents. They report that in thirty out of thirty-two pairs, the
proposers gave a positive amount of money to their responders. On the other hand, eleven
responders out of these thirty pairs returned more than the amounts initially given by their
proposers. When the subjects knew the social norm (the results of past game experiments),
they behaved with more trust and trustworthiness. In addition, the responders tended to return
more when the proposers gave more, which those authors interpret as the responders’ act of
rewarding kind behavior by bearing their own costs.
Even in such a simple game as the dictator game, a signiﬁcant number of dictators in
experiments give positive amounts of money to their opponents. One interpretation of this fact
is that dictators feel guilty for keeping the entire amount given by the experimenter. Another
is that they have a sense of equality or concern for others.
Camerer and Thaler (1995) advocate the following idea regarding the disparity between
predictions of game theory and the results of game experiments: namely, that fairness becomes
important, even in a one-shot game, because the subjects are inﬂuenced by the manners of daily
life. My claim is that many such manners are formed in conformance with long-term human
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ,/*relationships. Although Camerer and Thaler distinguish manners from altruism, I think that
the latter can be contained in the former.
There are other researchers with similar ideas. On the basis of various experiments with
many ethnic groups in di#erent countries, Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, and
McElreath (2001) claim that the assumption of pure egoists is not supported by experimental
results because attitudes and mindsets in ordinary lives inﬂuence the behavior of experimental
subjects. Indeed, the experimental results di#er greatly among di#erent ethnic groups, and
these authors interpret this fact as meaning that social institutions and cultural fairness criteria
a#ect subjects’ preferences and expectations. Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir
(1991) also point out cultural di#erences in fairness on the basis of the cross-national
di#erences in experimental results of the ultimatum game.
Using the concept of strong reciprocity, Gintis (2000) discusses the importance of
cooperative behavior and punishment of the uncooperative in situations irrelevant to kinship
or repeated games. One defect of reciprocal altruism generated in repeated games is that it
hardly leads to cooperation in cases where it is most needed, e.g. in wars, epidemics, and
famines that are likely to bring about a collapse of repetition.
Gintis (2000) claims that if a su$ciently large number of individuals have strong
reciprocity, society and groups can survive even when facing crises like the above. Strong
reciprocity is akin to self-sacriﬁce and altruism. From a di#erent standpoint, Hirshleifer
(1999) maintains that the existence of di#erent strategies beneﬁts society.
This paper will examine the results of trust-related game experiments conducted by the
author. These experimental games include both the above three standard types of games and
variant games devised by the author. One feature of the former experiments performed by the
author is that the numbers of subjects were su$ciently large to enhance the credibility of the
conclusions drawn from them. In fact, almost 200 samples were collected in all experiments.
This large sample size enables us to undertake some reliable regression analyses.
In the variant of the ultimatum game, responders were allowed to punish their proposers
without bearing their own costs, which facilitated punishment. In the variants of the dictator
and trust games, the participants played the games in the presence of several other subjects,
which facilitated monitoring by third parties in particular. Punishment and monitoring in
these variant games can be interpreted as corresponding to some cultural devices that are
intended to promote cooperation and/or e$ciency.
Since trust is a basic concept in this paper, it may be useful to provide its somewhat
rigorous deﬁnition here. I deﬁne individual A’s trust in individual Ba s A’s belief that Bw ill do
what Bs aid or (in case Bd id not say anything) what is considered to be ethical in society. This
belief needs to be expressed in terms of A’s subjective probability, the value of which depends
on many factors, such as culture, social relations between A and B, the matter at hand, and A’s
experiences.
The structure of this paper is the following. In Section 2 the results of my experiment of
the standard ultimatum game are examined. Section 3 discusses the experimental results of the
variant of the standard ultimatum game. Section 4 is concerned with the dictator game and its
variant game. In Sections 5 and 6, the standard trust game and its variant game are discussed,
respectively. Conclusions follow in Section 7.
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This section examines the experimental results of the standard ultimatum game organized
by the author. The method of this experiment was the following. The subjects were 196
university students whose major ﬁelds were social sciences, predominantly economics majors.
Each subject played the standard ultimatum game twice, once as a proposer and the other time
as a responder, each time with a di#erent opponent: the same pair never playing twice in order
to avoid retaliation or other interactive actions across games. This method generated 196
experimental results (samples) of this game.
The experimenter gave 100 points (rather than 1,000 yen) to each proposer and let him
make a decision as to how to divide the points within his pair. After he had made the decision
and o#ered a proposal, his responder decided whether or not to accept it. If it were accepted,
the payo# of each player would be exactly the same as the proposer’s decision. If not, the
payo# of each would be zero. The subjects were given certain incentives to seek as many points
as possible, which also applied to all subsequent experiments. Ho#man, McCabe, and Smith
(1996), Cameron (1999), and others show that experimental results are generally insensitive
to the magnitude of incentives in most experiments.
Table 1 shows the results of this experiment in the form of distributions of payo#s for the
proposers and responders, which are expressed in percentage terms. Here N stands for the
number of subjects (sample size) and m the mean payo#. The same is true of other tables.
Thus, for example, those with payo#s between 50 and 59 points represented 31.1% of all
subjects in the case of proposers and 24.0% in the case of responders. More than 70% of the
payo#s of the proposers are distributed between 50 and 79 points. About 13% of proposers
have zero payo#s because their proposals were rejected.
In contrast, about 70% payo#s of the responders are distributed between 30 and 59
points. The reason why more responders have zero payo#s is that some responders accepted
the proposal of 100 points for the proposer and zero points for the responder. There are also
minor exceptional cases in the following, but they may not be mentioned.
The mean payo#s are 53.6 points for the proposers and 33.3 points for the responders. The
proposers’ mean payo# is larger because of the structure of this game, i.e., the proposer has an
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nonnegative integers, the payo#s in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in this game are 99
points for the proposer and 1 point for the responder, as mentioned in the previous section. It
is true that this prediction of game theory is rarely realized in experiments, since the subjects
consider fairness as well as self-interest. However, proposers in this experiment can, in fact,
o#er proposals that are relatively advantageous to them but unlikely to be rejected.
These experimental results of the standard ultimatum game suggest that real human
beings are not necessarily interested merely in their self-interests. They also decide their actions
by taking values such as fairness into consideration. Hence, where a player expects that he is
going to obtain an extremely unfair payo#, he is likely to punish, by bearing his own costs, the
opponent responsible for the unfairness. Consequently, the sense of fairness that the players
possess needs to be considered when exact human behavior is to be analyzed.
In order for a responder to punish his unfair proposer in the standard ultimatum game,
the former himself needs to accept the worst state (zero payo#s, not only for the proposer but
also for himself). The very existence of this punishment cost causes many responders to accept
low payo#s. With this fact in mind, proposers o#er proposals that are relatively advantageous
to themselves.
The 13% or so of responders who rejected o#ers actually punished the unfair behavior
(excessive pursuit of self-interests) of their opponents. Obviously, those responders were not
pure egoists. In contrast, the fact that many proposers’ payo#s are between 60 and 79 points
and many responders’ payo#s are between 30 and 49 points implies that there are many
somewhat selﬁsh proposers who o#ered proposals with higher payo#s for themselves and many
somewhat selﬁsh responders who refrained from punishing unfair proposers.
III. A Variant of the Ultimatum Game
If the rule of the standard ultimatum game is changed so that responders can punish their
opponents without bearing their own costs, it becomes possible to analyze the nature of the
payo#s considered fair by the former. The latter, on the other hand, decide their o#ers taking
this into account. Hence, experiments enable us to elucidate what payo# proﬁle is generally
considered fair for game players.
For this reason I transformed the standard ultimatum game into the following variant
game. Namely, the behavioral rule for the proposer is the same as before, but the responder is
now allowed to reduce the points the proposer determined for himself while keeping his points
at the level determined by the proposer. More explicitly, when the proposer o#ers a proﬁle of
p points for himself and q points for the responder (pq100, p0, q0), the responder is
allowed to impose a punishment equal to r (0rp) on the proposer so that the proposer’s
payo# becomes equal to pr.
In this variant game, the responder can punish the proposer without bearing his own cost,
the amount of punishment being largely dependent on the fairness belief held by the former.
Generally speaking, Homo economicus in neoclassical economics are completely indi#erent to
other individuals’ incomes or utility levels, but Homo sapiens are very interested in them.
Fairness in question here is concerned with the relative magnitude of the two players’ payo#s.
Table 2 presents the experimental results of this variant game. What is prominent in this
IGJHI, 8JAIJG6A 9:K>8:H, 6C9 :;;>8>:C8N >C <6B: :ME:G>B:CIH 2006] ,/-table is that the payo# distributions of the proposers and responders are quite similar. In
particular, for both types of players the proportion of payo#s between 50 and 59 is the largest
and that of payo#s between 40 and 49 is the second largest. In contrast, most payo#s in Table
1 were distributed between 50 and 79 points for the proposers and between 30 and 59 points
for the responders respectively.
The mean payo#s of the two types of players shown in Table 2 are almost the same: the
mean payo# is 43.7 points for the proposers and 45.5 points for the responders. A comparison
between Tables 1 and 2 reveals that introducing the possibility of costless punishment has
reduced the proposers’ payo#s and increased those of the responders. Most proposers in this
variant game o#ered a proposal with smaller points for themselves and larger points for the
responders because they expected that they would incur punishment if they o#ered a proposal
that was too advantageous to them. This is also evident in the fact that the number of subjects
with zero payo# is much fewer in Table 2 than Table 1.
There is another important matter. The sum of the mean payo#s for the proposers and
responders is 86.9 points in Table 1 and 89.2 points in Table 2 respectively. Although the
increment is small, this di#erence suggests that the introduction of costless punishment is likely
to increase e$ciency in the ultimatum game.
It is beneﬁcial to examine in more detail the o#ers the proposers made and the nature of
the punishments the responders carried out. Table 3 shows in percentage terms the frequency
of combinations of the proposers’ o#er to themselves and the corresponding punishment the
responders imposed. It suggests that a larger o#er to a proposer tends to induce a larger
punishment.
The table reveals that those proposers who made o#ers between 50 and 59 points to
themselves incurred no or relatively light punishments. In fact, more than a third of all subjects
evaded punishment by making o#ers between 50 and 59 points to themselves. Furthermore,
71.5% of the proposers who made o#ers between 50 and 59 points to themselves evaded
punishment. Though not clearly shown in the table, 31.6% of all proposers made an o#er of
50 points to themselves and completely evaded punishment. Among those who made an o#er
of 50 points to themselves, 87.3% evaded punishment.
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to this game situation. It should be emphasized that each subject’s payo# obtained in this game
was independent of his e#ort. In other words, he did not obtain a high payo# by exerting e#ort.
If this game had required the exertion of e#ort, di#erent fairness criteria might have been
applied.
It is interesting to note that the average payo#s of the proposers and responders converge
and e$ciency increases when the latter are allowed to punish the former at no cost. Cultural
e#orts and institutions that enable punishment of unfair behavior at low cost have favorable
e#ects. Real world examples corresponding to these observations are attitudes that actively
punish those who do unfair things as well as institutions that encourage the disclosure of
injustices. They increase e$ciency because such cultural factors generate self-restraint and
subsequent cooperation.
IV. Dictator Game and its Variant
Next, we examine the experimental results of the standard dictator game and its variant.
The subjects were the 196 students who participated in the above experiments of the ultimatum
game and its variant. As in the previous experiments, the experimenter gave each of the
proposers (dictators) 100 points. All subjects played this game with new opponents.
If individuals in the real world were pure egoists, the dictators in this game would keep
all 100 points to themselves. Hence, if they give a positive amount to their opponents, they can
be judged not as pure egoists but as having some degree of altruism.
Table 4 reports the experimental results of the standard dictator game undertaken by the
author. Most payo#s of the dictators are distributed between 50 and 100 points, with those
between 80 and 100 points quite large in proportion. The mean payo# for the dictators is 81.9
points, which is much greater than that of 53.6 points for the proposers in the standard
ultimatum game. This is because the dictators have no risk of incurring punishments. In short,
although this experiment reveals the selﬁshness of human beings, the fact that the dictators
T67A: 3. V6G>6CI D; UAI>B6IJB G6B::D >HIG>7JI>DC D; PGDEDH:GH’O ;;:GH ID
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4049 9.7 1.5 1.5
5059 34.7 4.6 7.7 1.0 0.5
6069 7.1 3.1 8.7 0.5 1.0
7079 2.6 1.5 1.0 0.5 2.0 1.0
8089 0.5 1.0 1.5 1.0
9099 0.5 0.5 0.5
100 0.5 0.5
IGJHI, 8JAIJG6A 9:K>8:H, 6C9 :;;>8>:C8N >C <6B: :ME:G>B:CIH 2006] ,//gave an average of about 20 points to their opponents indicates that they also have some degree
of altruism at the same time.
I also devised a variant of the standard dictator game and attempted an experiment, the
results of which we shall now examine. The standard dictator game is played in a ‘locked
room’, whereby only the dictator and his opponent know what decision the former has made.
(In the above experiment, even the experimenter did not know it because the experiment
guaranteed anonymity.) Decision making in locked rooms tends to be advantageous to those
who have power.
For this reason, the experimenter ordered each dictator and his opponent to play this
variant game in front of eight spectators or third parties. Because both subjects and spectators
were students of the same university, some of them may have been friends or acquaintances.
The aim of this experiment is to examine simply how the existence of ‘others’ eyes’ plays the
role of psychologically punishing unjust behavior, since this game involves no explicit
punishment that a#ects the points obtained by the players.
The experimental results are presented in Table 5. The mean payo# for the dictators is
now 77.4 points, which is slightly lower than that in the standard dictator game shown in Table
4. It is noteworthy that while 25.0% of the dictators obtained 100 points in Table 4, the
corresponding proportion is now only 16.9%. If others’ eyes are present, human beings
exercise some self-restraint, even in this simple game. This fact suggests that it is beneﬁcial to
society and organizations to release detailed information about the decisions made by those
who have power. The e#ects of others’ eyes must be much stronger in the real world than in
experiments, since they deﬁnitely a#ect the evaluations and reputations of such decision
makers and determine their future payo#s in many other ensuing games that will arise there.
V. Standard Trust Game
The standard experimental trust game was originally invented to measure the extent to
which individuals trust others or how much they invest in others on the basis of trust. In other
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self-interests. In the real world, high trust tends to generate cooperation and e$ciency. In this
game experiment, trust and trustworthiness also lead to higher payo#s.
The subjects the author used for this experiment were those who had experienced the
previous experiments, but with the size now reduced to 188. As before, the experimenter gave
100 points to each proposer. Subsequently, he tripled the points each proposer decided to give
to the responder.
Table 6 presents the distribution of the points the proposers o#ered to themselves. What
is salient here is that one third of the proposers gave all 100 points to their responders. In a pair
composed of purely individually rational human beings, the proposer would not give any
points to his responder (the former would keep 100 points for himself). In this experiment
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The payo#s in this game are ﬁnalized after the responder has determined how many points
to give back to the proposer. Table 7 shows the distributions of payo#s thus ﬁnalized. On
average the responders enjoy higher payo#s, the mean payo# for the proposers being 103.2
points and that for the responders 116.4 points. This is because the latter have the power to
determine the allocation of the tripled points. If the former had very strong distrust in the
latter, however, the mean payo# for the former could exceed that for the latter. The fact that
most payo#s are less than 160 points is common to both distributions in Table 7, with no other
noteworthy similarities.
As far as the mean payo#s are concerned, the proposers in this experiment do not seem
to have gained any beneﬁts by trusting their responders and investing some points. Even if the
proposers keep all 100 points, they will achieve with certainty a payo# of 100 points, which is
almost equal to the mean payo# for the proposers in Table 7. In contrast, if trust can exert a
full e#ect, the proposer’s payo# becomes equal to 150 points, the case in which the proposer
gives the entire 100 points to his responder, who then divides the tripled points equally between
the two.
Nevertheless, if the average joint wealth is taken into account, the proposer’s trust in the
responder brought about considerable beneﬁts in this experiment. The mean payo# for the
responders is as large as 116.4 points: this would have been zero if the proposers had not
trusted them at all and invested no points. If only the mean payo#s were considered, it is the
responders that obtained almost all the beneﬁts of trust in this experiment. If the proposers had
known this fact beforehand, they might not have given any points to the responders because
of risk aversion.
Behind the payo#s shown in Table 7 are the relationships between proposers’ o#ers and
responders’ returns. In order to see them, let x denote the points a proposer o#ered to himself
and y his payo#, and apply a regression analysis with x as the independent variable and y as the
dependent variable. Then, the regression equation estimated by the OLS becomes:
y ˆ 124.9  0.54 xR
2  0.33 (1)
(41.9) (9.47)
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19
1019 0.5
2029 0.5 0.5 0.5
3039 0.5 0.5 0.5
4049 0.5 0.5 0.5
5059 0.5 1.1 1.1 2.7
6069 1.1 4.8 2.7
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This equation demonstrates that those proposers who o#ered smaller points to themselves
achieved higher payo#s. The negative relationship shown in equation (1) suggests that
behavior based on trust tends to bring about advantageous results. This fact could not be
revealed when only the mean payo#s are considered as above.
Table 8 shows a detailed distribution of the combinations of the points the proposers
o#ered to themselves and their payo#s. It provides comprehensive information about the
behavior of all the subjects in this experiment. The noteworthy fact in the table is that the
proportion of the proposers who o#ered zero points to themselves and achieved payo#s
between 150 and 159 points is as large as 18.6%. Although not shown in the table, all these
proposers obtained a payo# equal to 150 points.
The proportion of proposers who achieved a payo# between 150 and 159 points (more
precisely, 150 points) among those who o#ered zero points to themselves is 56.5%. In e#ect,
they divided the maximum possible joint wealth evenly with their responders. These responders
were not egoists because they gave half of the 300 points back to their proposers, even though
they were allowed to keep all of them. They responded with cooperation to the cooperation of
the proposers or with trustworthiness to the trust of the proposers. This result is consistent
with Rabin (1993) who holds that individuals tend to sacriﬁce their interests for the sake of
those who are kind to them.
The case in which proposers o#ered zero points to themselves is convenient to measure the
relative importance placed by the subjects between trust and the pursuit of self-interests. A
proportion of 32.9% of the entire proposers o#ered zero points to themselves, a relatively large
number. Among such proposers, those whose payo#s were less than 100 points amounted only
to 10.9%.
The mean payo# for the proposers who o#ered zero points to themselves is 130.1 points,
which is in stark contrast with the mean payo# of 103.2 points for all proposers. As far as this
experiment is concerned, those proposers who highly trusted their opponents were eventually
handsomely rewarded. Incidentally, those responders who could not gain much trust put a
higher priority on securing reasonably high payo#s for themselves rather than exhibiting
trustworthiness.
O;;:GH ID T=:BH:AK:H 6C9 T=:>G P6ND;;H (N188)
Payo#s
100109 110119 120129 130139 140149 150159 160169 170179 180300
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(pre-tripled values) and the points the responder returned. Let the former be the independent
variable x and the latter the dependent variable y for a regression analysis. Then, the estimated
equation becomes the following:
y ˆ29.09  1.54 xR
2  0.80 (2)
(7.45) (27.02)
It is quite impressive in this equation that an additional point o#ered by the proposers to the
responders is rewarded with the latter’s return of about 1.54 points on average, which
represents almost half the triple of one point.
VI. A Variant of the Standard Trust Game
I also devised a variant game of the standard trust game, whose experimental results are
examined in this section. The subjects in this variant game played the standard trust game in
the presence of other subjects, as in the variant dictator game. An experiment of this game
makes it possible to measure how others’ eyes a#ect trust, trustworthiness, and related
behavior.
In this experiment I formed many groups of about ﬁve pairs. Each pair played the
standard trust game in front of the other pairs within its group. More concretely, all the pairs
ﬁrst played the game in turn before the others’ gaze, then playing it again in the same way. The
ﬁrst was a demonstration, which allowed all pairs within the group to observe how the others
behaved. Without this demonstration, some pairs would have been unable to properly observe
the behavior of the other pairs before their decision makings.
This observation of others’ behavior has actually two functions. The ﬁrst is to provide an
opportunity for each player to know the other players’ values or ideas, which has the e#ect of
promoting socialization. The second is to provide an opportunity to monitor the behavior of
the other players, which has the e#ect of deterring the players from taking overly-egoistic
T67A: 9. V6G>6CI D; TGJHI G6B::
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of third party spectators.
Table 9 reports the distribution of the points the proposers o#ered to themselves. This
corresponds to Table 6 for the standard trust game. A comparison of these two tables reveals
that Table 9 has more proposers who o#ered zero points to themselves. In fact, such proposers
represent half of the total in Table 9, as opposed to only one third in Table 6. The mean in
Table 6 is 40.2 points and that in Table 9 is 25.2 points, demonstrating the existence of more
trust before others’ eyes.
There seem to be three related reasons for this fact. The ﬁrst is that trust and trustwor-
thiness became the norm or the subjects felt that they would bring about larger payo#s. The
second is that the proposers expected that the responders would not take an overly selﬁsh
action before others’ eyes. The proposers’ trust in the responders is higher when trustworthi-
ness becomes the norm or when others’ eyes are watching. The third is that the proposers
hesitated to engage in overly distrustful behavior in front of others looking on.
Table 10 shows the distributions of the payo#s of the proposers and responders respec-
tively. Just as in the standard trust game shown in Table 7, the mean payo# for the responders
is higher than that for the proposers, the former being 136.7 points and the latter being 112.9
points. Here again most payo#s are smaller than 160 points in the two distributions, with no
other prominent similarities between the two.
What should be emphasized here is that the mean payo# for the proposers is 9.7 points
larger and that for the responders is 20.3 points larger than those in the standard trust game
shown in Table 7. This means that e$ciency has increased in this variant game, for the
above-mentioned three reasons.
As equation (1), a regression equation is estimated with the proposer’s o#er to himself as
the independent variable x and his payo# as the dependent variable y:
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2  0.09 (3)
(31.8) (4.27)
Here again we can see a negative relationship between the two variables as before.
Table 11 reveals a detailed distribution of the combinations of the proposers’ o#ers to
themselves and their payo#s. This corresponds to Table 8 for the standard trust game. It
should be noted that the proportion of proposers who o#ered zero points to themselves and
obtained payo#s between 150 and 159 points (actually all of them are 150 points) increased
greatly from 18.6% in Table 8 to 26.1% in Table 11. This is also due to the increases in trust
and trustworthiness that are generated by others looking on.
In Table 11, 52.9% of those proposers who o#ered zero points to themselves obtained
payo#s between 150 and 159 (actually 150) points. Furthermore, only 13.8% of such
proposers obtained payo#s smaller than 100 points. The mean payo# of those proposers who
o#ered zero points to themselves is 125.5 points compared with a mean payo# of 112.9 points
for all proposers. These results are almost identical to those shown in Table 8. The responders
who gained complete trust responded with trustworthiness.
As equation (2), the following equation shows the estimated relationship between the
proposer’s o#er to his responder (pre-tripled value) x and the points the latter gave back y:
y ˆ17.94  1.41 xR
2  0.53 (4)
(2.29) (14.6)
This result is similar to equation (2). It is again impressive that the estimated coe$cient is close
to 1.5.
Two thirds of the proposers in the above experiment involving the standard trust game
o#ered positive points to themselves, while the corresponding proportion is only half in the
experiment involving the variant trust game. The larger proportion in the former eventually
reduced the mean payo# for the proposers. Thus, it is beneﬁcial to devise methods to improve
the ine$ciency in the former. The method examined in this paper involves introducing
onlookers, as discussed in the above variant trust game.
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[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ,0,Though not examined in this paper, there are other methods that are likely to increase
e$ciency in the game situations considered in this paper. One is to introduce persuasion by a
third party. As discussed in Arai (1995, 2001), such persuasion has a dramatic e#ect on
promoting cooperation or e$ciency. Another is to establish institutions that induce good
human relations among those concerned and there are also other conceivable methods.
Contrary to neoclassical ideas, trust-related beliefs are not invariant. They can actually be
improved by e#orts and devices, generating higher e$ciency.
VII. Conclusions
This paper has considered certain cultural devices for increasing e$ciency in trust-related
games and examined their e#ects by performing experiments. Using the resultant large
samples, it also ran some regression analyses on the relationships between interesting variables.
The games used for the experiments were the ultimatum game, the dictator game, the trust
game, and their variants.
The experimental results of the standard ultimatum game suggest that individuals in the
real world are not interested solely in their own payo#s. What became particularly clear in the
experiment of the variant ultimatum game, where responders could punish proposers without
bearing their own costs, is that equality is a very important value in game situations.
Many subjects showed some altruism, even in the standard dictator game. The degree of
this altruism increased when others’ eyes were introduced in this game.
The experiment of the standard trust game shows in particular that there were only a
negligible number of subjects who believed that human beings were pure egoists and that those
who had higher trust tended to achieve higher payo#s. It became clear, among other things,
that if the trust game is played before others’ eyes, the degree of proposers’ trust in responders
increases and e$ciency is thus enhanced.
This paper argued that some cultural devices or activities, such as punishment and
monitoring, increase e$ciency in game situations. It should be added that e$ciency can be
attained in organizations and society in the real world only after such cultural activities are
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